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 The Indian Supreme Court and Federalism 
 
Rekha Saxena and Wilfried Swenden 
 
1. Indian Federalism: origins, features and the federal nature of the judiciary 
 
India is a union made up of 29 states and 7 union territories. India emerged as the largest and 
most populous country from the partition of British India in 1947. During the Raj (British rule, 1857-
1947), India came to be governed as a quasi-federal state. The Government of India Act (1935) conferred 
a degree of self-rule on indigenously ruled provinces but combined this with a strong (and British-
controlled) center which held most of the legislative and taxation powers and could wield emergency 
powers such as the right to intervene in and suspend provincial powers in the case of a breakdown of 
provincial law and order.  
Prior to independence, British Indians never obtained the right to vote in national elections, but 
provincial elections took place in 1937 based on a restricted franchise (which involved about 15 percent 
of the indigenous population). These elections confirmed the dominant position of the Congress 
movement/Party in the sub-continent, but they also laid bare the weakness of the Muslim League. The 
prospect of independence heightened Hindu-Muslim tensions. To save the territorial integrity of British 
India as an independent state, representatives of the British government, Congress and the Muslim 
League put forward a very loose federal structure in which a weak center with power-sharing 
mechanisms among Hindu and Muslim representatives would co-exist with strong Muslim or Hindu-
majority provinces.1 The failure of this (or similar) proposals made Partition all but inevitable and they 
help to explain why independent India (without the Muslim majority provinces of Pakistan) introduced 
a relatively centralized constitution.2 This constitution had much more in common with the Government 
of India Act (1935) in terms of the distribution of powers between the center and the states (the word 
provinces is no longer used) than with the loose confederal constitutional proposals that were proposed 
immediately prior to independence. Schedule VII of the constitution sets out the distribution of 
legislative powers in a union list, concurrent list (with central paramountcy) and state list. Residual 
powers reside with the centre. Legislative and fiscal powers weigh heavily in favor of the centre, though 
the states are responsible for implementing the most important laws and they also dominate important 
fields such as policing, education, land, agriculture and health. A summative list of the distribution of 
legislative competencies can be found in Table 1 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1  ADENEY., K. Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation in India and Pakistan, Basingstoke, Palgrave-
Macmillan, 2007 and SWENDEN, W., ‘Governing Diversity in South Asia. Explaining Divergent Pathways in 
India and Pakistan’, Publius: the Journal of Federalism, 48, 1 (Winter 2018), 102-133.  
2 For a historical overview, see for instance, SAXENA, R., Situating Federalism: Mechanisms of 
Intergovernmental Relations in Canada and India, Delhi, Manohar, 2006 
Table 1: The distribution of Legislative Powers under the Indian constitution  
 
Union (Centre)  List State List Concurrent List 
Foreign affairs, defense, 
atomic energy, citizenship, 
currency, foreign exchange, 
foreign trade and commerce, 
immigration, highways, 
railways, shipping post and 
telecommunications, 
institutes of national 
importance (including central 
universities), income tax, 
corporation tax, excise duty, 
customs, sales tax 
Public order, local 
government, public health 
and sanitation, agriculture, 
fisheries, police, water 
supply, irrigation, land rights, 
land tenure, taxes on 
agricultural income, tolls and 
capitation taxes 
Criminal law, forests, 
economic management, 
economic and social 
planning, trade unions, 
education, marriage, 
preventive detention, 
wildlife protection, 
population control and 
family planning, social 
security, property 
management 
Source: Indian constitution, Schedule VII (own summary).  
 
India inherited provinces (though renamed them as states), but also integrated more than 500 
princely states (sometimes forcefully) into its territory. Articles 2 and 3 of the Indian constitution set out 
the process for remapping the internal boundaries of the ‘federal’ units, which can be done unilaterally 
by the central government with the consent of the national Parliament. India occupies a unique position 
among contemporary federal states in that new states have been carved out of existing states since 1947. 
The most profound reorganization took place between 1953 and 1966 and made states linguistically 
more homogeneous. For the above reasons, it has been said that India is not a ‘coming-together’ 
federation of the traditional type (such as the US, Australia or Switzerland). Rather, a centralized ‘union’ 
was meant to ‘hold India together’.3 For the same reason, except for Jammu and Kashmir, Indian states 
lack their own constitution and the format of their state institutions is prescribed within the lengthy 
Indian constitution.  
With independence also came the responsibility for organizing the judiciary, a function which 
had been entirely preoccupied by the British before. The Constituent Assembly paid considerable 
attention to judicial independence, the role of the Supreme Court and judicial review.4 The Government 
of India Act (1935) already set up a ‘Federal Court’ with limited powers on centre-provincial issues. 
The founding ‘fathers’ of the Indian Constitution extended its remit by establishing a Supreme Court 
which would not only resolve ‘federal’ disputes between the states and the centre or Union government 
but also have broad appellate jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases. The constitution further stipulates 
that states should have High Courts. In 1956, when India only had 14 states, 14 state High Courts existed. 
Although the number of states has risen to 29 in present-day India, the country only has 24 High Courts. 
For instance, the states of Punjab and Haryana share a High Court and the same holds for Assam, 
Mizoram and Nagaland.  
Arguably, the very detailed and relatively centralized provisions of the Constitution, have 
constrained the leeway of the Supreme Court in strengthening the states under Indian federalism. Even 
                                                             
3 STEPAN, A., LINZ, J.J. AND YADAV, Y., eds., State-Nations. India and other Multinational States, Baltimore, 
Johns Hopkins, 2011.  
4 AUSTIN, G., The Indian Constitution. Cornerstone of a Nation, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 164-
85.  
so, judicial review has both weakened and strengthened federalism, sometimes even in interpreting the 
scope and nature of judicial intervention when reviewing the same constitutional article as the example 
of President’s Rule (Article 356) attests (see section 4).5  
 
2. Organization of the Supreme Court  
 
The Indian Supreme Court can review federal statutes as well as statutes of the states. Unlike 
the US states, the Indian states, -with the exception of Jammu and Kashmir - do not have their own 
constitution. From a comparative perspective, the Indian Supreme Court stands out because the input of 
the President, national executive and legislature in the nomination of its justices is rather limited. Article 
124(2) stipulates that the President appoints the judges by warrant but ‘after consultation with such of 
the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the states as the President may deem for the 
purpose’. Seeking to maximize its influence in the appointment process at a time when India had faced 
a nation-wide Emergency, the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Sankalchand Himmatlal Seth (1977)6 
argued that while consultation did not imply a Supreme Court veto, it entitled the Court to an 
examination of the ‘circumstances [which] entered into the verdict of the executive if it departs from the 
counsel given by the Chief Justice.’ Although in SP Gupta (1981)7 the Supreme Court appeared to 
confirm the primacy of the central government (President) in the appointment process, this decision was 
decisively overruled in 1993 in the so-called ‘Second Judges’ case.8 In it, the obligation to consult had 
to be understood as ‘binding’ on the central executive. The case also established what is effectively a 
‘collegium’ of senior judges since the advice of the Chief Justice must take cognizance of the preferences 
of at least two of the most senior judges in the Supreme Court, a number which increased to four 
following another ruling in 1998. 9  Judicial review therefore progressively contributed towards a 
situation in which the Indian Supreme Court wrested autonomy from the national executive and 
legislative branches in its own appointment; something which the latter have sought to redress through 
the 99th constitutional amendment (2014) which would have established a National Judicial 
Appointments Commission of whom half the members would have been made up of non-judges. In 
2015, the amendment was struck down by the Supreme Court10  because it violated the ‘basic structure’ 
of the Indian constitution of which judicial independence is regarded as an integral part. 11 Due to the 
(increasing) primacy of the judiciary in its appointment, the Supreme Court could be expected to remain 
relatively insulated from direct political pressure.12  
In terms of regional representation, the Supreme Court draws for its composition from justices 
from state high courts, and within that, quite substantially from high courts from states which are further 
removed from the centre in a political sense. For instance, in India, regional sentiments are higher in the 
non-Hindi belt states, given their often linguistically and religiously distinctive nature. Adeney has 
drawn our attention to the majoritarian character of India’s central executive and legislature, despite an 
informal but limited practice of incorporating members of distinctive castes, religious groups or regions 
                                                             
5 BHANU MEHTA, P. “India’s Judiciary: The Promise of Uncertainty”, in KAPUR D. and BHANU META, P., eds., 
Public Institutions in India: Performance and Design, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2005, 158-93.   
6 Union of India v Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth (1977) 4 SCC 193 
7 S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) Supp SCC 67 [710-11] 
8 Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 441 
9 SRIKRISHNA, R., “Judicial Independence”, in CHOUDHRY, S., KHOSLA, M. AND BHANU MEHTA, P., eds., The 
Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 349-66.  
10 Supreme Court Advocates-on Record Association v Union of India 2015 SCC OnLine SC. 964 
11 SRIKRISHNA, R. op.cit., 352-58 
12 On this point, see also GAUTAM K., ‘Semi Presidentialism under the Indian Constitution’, 4 July 2015,  
Available on line at https://works.bepress.com/khagesh_gautam/6/ ; accessed 23 December 2017  
in cabinet.13 In a recent study of appointments to the Indian Supreme Court, Chandrachud argues 
that from a formal point of view there is no requirement of regional representation in the court 
either.14 In fact, the constitution of India, in article 124 stipulates that candidate justices must have five 
years of experience as a (state) high court judge, ten years standing as a (state) high court advocate, or 
be a ‘distinguished jurist’. In six decades, ‘distinguished jurists’, i.e. faculty of Law Schools without 
experience as lawyers or judges have not been appointed to the Supreme Court, making the link with 
state high courts very important. Based on interviews and quantitative analysis, Chandrachud finds 
indeed that there is a wide geographic diversity on the Supreme Court bench. Using ‘the state to which 
a high court judge was first appointed as a criterion to mark the regional designation’, Chandrachud 
observes that not more than two (or in very few cases three) judges of the same high Court serve on the 
Supreme Court at the same time.15 The growing size of the Supreme Court bench (from 8 seats in 1950 
to 14 seats in 1960, 18 in 1977, 26 in 1986 and 31 today) has facilitated regional representation. By 
2012 nearly all states had former high court justices represented on the bench. Of all the ‘state’ high 
Courts only the Delhi High Court has delegated a disproportionate number of justices to the Supreme 
Court, reflecting its reputation as one of the most distinguished high courts in the land with a 
disproportionately high case load. The 4 (now 5) Southern states have always had between 22 and 35 
percent of bench members, whereas the Northern states (which includes Jammu and Kashmir but not 
Bihar which is classified as East) usually held between 30 and 35 percent of the seats, reflecting 
percentages that are regionally more balanced than the distribution of seats in the main political 
institutions (in particular, the central executive and cabinet).16  
Despite the increasing autonomy of the Supreme Court in terms of its own recruitment, a 
procedure was put in place by which justices could be removed prior to their retirement age of 65 by the 
President of India on grounds of incapacity of proven misbehavior on receipt of an address by both 
houses of Parliament adopted by two-thirds majority.17 To protect the independence of the judiciary, it 
was decided that the salaries of justices should be laid down in Schedule 2 of the Indian constitution (a 
similar provision applies to High Court judges). Schedule 2 itself can only be amended with the 
concurrent consent of the union Parliament and half of the state legislatures; subjecting it to the highest 
procedural threshold for constitutional change. In contrast, parliament can legislate on the allowances, 
leave and pensions of Supreme Court justices. Similar provisions in relation to the salaries, allowances, 
leave and pensions of administrative personnel and officers of the Court are determined by the President 
of India in consultation with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Expenses of the Court are 
chargeable to the revenues of the country18  
 
3. Supreme Court competencies  
 
 Approximately eighty percent of the Supreme Court’s workload consists of appellate jurisdiction 
in relation to civil matters (Article 133), criminal matters (Article 134) questions of constitutional 
interpretation (Article 132) and (especially) appeals by special leave of the court (Art 136).19 Most 
                                                             
13 ADENEY, K., “A move to majoritarian nationalism? Challenges of Representation in South Asia”, 
Representation, 50, (1), 2015, p.7-21 
14 CHANDRACHUD, A., The Informal Constitution: Unwritten Criteria in Selecting Judges for the Supreme Court 
of India, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2014,  
15 ibid., p. 244 
16 Ibid., 236-254 
17 AUSTIN, G., op.cit., p, 178-9 
18 ibid., p. 179, p. 183-4 
19 Approximately eighty percent is the figure given by VAKIL, R., ‘Jurisdiction’ in CHOUDHRY, S., KHOSLA, 
M. AND BHANU MEHTA, P., eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2016, p. 368 and in turn derives from quantitative analysis in ROBINSON, N., ‘A Quantitative Analysis 
appeals are dependent on a referral by a state High Court although criminal appeals exist as a matter of 
right and appeals by special leave can proceed from any court or tribunal.20 Appeal cases can be decided 
in benches of two judges, which, in the view of Vakil explains a certain degree of arbitrariness, for 
instance in how the Court has applied restrictions on the rights to appeal and determine principles on 
the exercise of its own discretion.21 The other activities of the Court are linked to constitutional matters 
and have a more direct significance for federalism. Constitutional issues are decided in benches of at 
least five judges. Dissenting opinions are always expressed in the judgements of the Court, so it is 
possible to discern which judges concurred or dissented with a majority opinion and on which grounds. 
Article 143 of the Constitution enables the President to consult the Court ‘on any question of law or fact 
of ‘public importance’. Since its inception and until 2016, the Court has rendered opinions in 12 
cases.22The capacity to render advisory opinions has been criticized because the advice of the Court is 
binding upon lower courts, yet the central government defines the reference and advisory opinions are 
not open to appeal or review. Therefore, there is a central executive bias in terms of which questions the 
Court is asked to render an opinion on and the Court may even be asked to reconsider its own previous 
judgements.  
On federal issues, the Court deals with ‘legal’ disputes between a state or states and the union or 
between states. Article 131 of the Indian constitution confines such questions to ‘legal’ issues, not 
political disputes, which normally should be addressed through intergovernmental means (Prime 
Ministers Conference, Inter-State Council, or intergovernmental channels of an administrative nature 
more widely). Disputes of this matter must be brought to the Court by the government of India, or the 
state governments acting through their ministers. Article 262 of the Constitution puts inter-water river 
disputes beyond the purview of the Court. Such disputes are settled by specifically set up Tribunals and 
the role of the Court is limited to the enforcement of a river sharing award enacted under the Inter-state 
River Water Disputes Act (1956) or to disputes which cannot be brought under the IWDA’s remit of 
what constitutes a ‘water dispute.’ 23  
Finally, the Court also considers appeals on cases involving ‘a substantial question of law as to the 
interpretation of this Constitution’ (Article 132). In the view of Vakil, the Court has limited its powers 
in this regard since it has refused to hear appeals from the judgements of single judges in state High 
Courts, including civil appeals (which, so the Supreme Court seems to argue, could be appealed to a 
wider bench of the same Court first).24  
In each of the above matters, the Supreme Court acts in a responsive mode: it needs to be faced with 
an appeal, asked to render its advice or consider a question of a federal or other constitutional nature. 
Yet, much of the activism with which the Supreme Court has come to be associated since the 1980s is 
linked to so-called ‘Public-Interest-Litigation’ for which Article 32 of the constitution provides the 
basis. This article enables any party with sufficient interest (‘person aggrieved’) to petition the Court 
for enforcement of any fundamental rights in the constitution. Although still responsive, in a sense that 
the Court will not act unless a petition is brought to its attention, in time the Court has relaxed its 
requirements for ‘locus standi’; i.e. it gave access not only to those individuals whose constitutional 
rights were endangered over and above the rights of the public in general, but also to those citizens, for 
instance civil rights activists, who decided to sue on behalf of a discriminated group, e.g. the 
underprivileged. This enabled the Court to play a key role in the protection of human rights, a role it 
                                                             
of the Indian Supreme Court’s Workload’ (2013), 10 (3), Journal of Empirical Legal Studies,  570 and 
DHAVAN R., The Supreme Court under Strain: The Challenge of Arrears, NM Tripathi, 1978 which cover 
respectively the Supreme Court’s workload from 1993 to 2011 and from 1950 to 1980.  
20 VAKIL, R., op.cit., 367-85.  
21 ibid., p. 372 
22 ibid., p. 374 
23 ibid., p. 376.  
24 Ibid., p. 377-8/ 
particularly sought to play to make good on its record during the Emergency when the Court was 
complicit in sanctioning the denial of civil and political rights.25 The ‘judicial activism’ with which the 
Supreme Court of the last few decades has been associated relates to this dimension in the main. Yet, as 
this activism does not touch upon ‘federal’ issues per se, we will not further elaborate on it in the 
remainder of this overview.26 
 
4. Supreme Court jurisprudence on federal issues  
 
As mentioned in section 1, the jurisprudence of the Court has altered the direction of centre-state 
relations in India. Over time, the Court has become more appreciative of state rights, a feature which 
many observers see as compliant with the stronger position of the states in economics and politics.27 In 
political terms, India has had a pluralized party system in which state-based parties were needed to prop 
up a central parliamentary majority for much of the period between 1989 and 2014. This created the 
conditions in which central governments became more accepting of political state autonomy. 
Simultaneously, the Indian economy became less heavily planned from the top and liberalization 
enabled the states to court private investment (domestic or foreign) to stimulate their economies. 
Although this process started during the 1980s, it very much accelerated during the 1990s.  
However, a more favorable reading of state rights is not confined to all areas. For instance, in the 
overview below we observe that this has been the case for the policing of Presidents Rule (Article 356), 
the inclusion of federalism as a part of the basic doctrine which places federalism beyond the purview 
of constitutional amendment, and in recent decades also disputes on the distribution of legislative powers 
between the union and the states. However, the Supreme Court has been less supportive of increasing 
the rights of the states in foreign affairs or state reorganization. In the following sections, we briefly 
review the jurisprudence of the Court in those five areas.  
 In relation to President’s Rule, the power of the President of India to take over the 
administration of a state in case of breakdown of constitutional machinery has persistently been a bone 
of contention between the union and the states. When the Janata Party came to power in 1977, it issued 
a directive/letter to Congress ruled states governments to resign or face the risk of proclamation of 
emergency under article 356. The states challenged this directive before the Supreme Court. The matter 
was decided by a seven-judge bench. In State of Rajasthan vs. Union of India (1977), Justices P.N. 
Bhagwati and A.C. Gupta firmly observed :“The court cannot, in these circumstances, go into the 
question of correctness or adequacy of the facts and circumstances on which the satisfaction of the 
Central Government is based.  That would be a dangerous exercise for the court, both because it is not 
a fit instrument for determining a question of this kind and also because the court would thereby assume 
                                                             
25 DIVAN, S. “Public Interest Litigation”,  in CHOUDHRY, S., KHOSLA, M. AND BHANU MEHTA, P., eds., The 
Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, p 662-79.  
26 See DESAI, A.H. and MURALIDHAR, S., ‘Public Interest Litigation: Potential and Problems’ in KIRPAL, B.N., 
DESAI, A.H., SUBRAMANIUM G., DHAVAN, R. and RAMCHANDRAN, R., eds. Supreme but not Infallible. Essays 
in Honour of the Supreme Court of India, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, 159-92 and SATHE, S.P., 
Judicial Activism in India. Transgressing Borders and Enforcing Limits, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 
2002.  
27 On the role of the Supreme Court in centre-state disputes, see TEWARI, M. and SAXENA R., ‘The Supreme 
Court of India: the rise of Judicial Power and the Protection of Federalism’ in ARONEY N. and KINCAID J.,eds., 
Courts in Federal Countries. Unitarists of Federalists?, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2017. For a 
recent collection of essays debating the rise of the states in Indian Politics and its effect on 
intergovernmental relations, public policy and the management of ethnic conflict, see Chanchal Kumar 
Sharma and Wilfried Swenden, eds., Continuity and Change in Indian Federalism, India Review, 16, (1), 2017, 
42-65; also published as Chanchal Kumar Sharma and Wilfried Swenden, eds., Understanding Indian 
Federalism: Competing Perspectives, New Challenges and Future Directions, London, Routledge, 2018.  
the function of the Central Government and in doing so, enter the ‘political thicket’, which it must avoid 
if it is to retain its legitimacy with the people28. Yet, A.K. Roy vs. Union of India, (1982) the Supreme 
Court ruled that the constitutional position under which the Rajasthan case was decided, “cannot any 
longer hold good”.29 A more definitive judicial stamp on this interpretation came in the Supreme Court 
judgement in S.R. Bommai vs Vs. Union of India, 1994 in which the Supreme Court ruled that “The 
exercise of power by the President under Article 356 (1) to issue proclamation is subject to the judicial 
review at least to the extent of examining whether the conditions precedent to the issuance of the 
proclamation have been satisfied or not.  This examination will necessarily involve the scrutiny as to 
whether there existed material for the satisfaction of the President that a situation had arisen in which 
the Government of the State could not be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the 
constitution.”30 Since this judgement was delivered, the frequency of the Presidential takeover of a state 
administration has markedly declined. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has upheld its activist stance in 
cases which have followed since. For instance, in Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006)31 the 
Supreme Court invalidated the Presidential dissolution of the Bihar Legislative Assembly a few months 
after the elections in 2005 on the advice of the governor who anticipated the formation of a non-Congress 
government. 
In two very recent cases which emerged in a context in which the BJP had recaptured an absolute 
parliamentary majority in the 2014 general elections, the Supreme Court held on to its previous position 
in defensive of the states. A crisis emerged in Uttarakhand on 18 March 2016 when nine Congress Party 
leaders rebelled against Congress Chief Minister Rawat, and joined the opposition camp. The central 
government imposed President’s rule just the day before the floor test was scheduled to ascertain 
whether the ruling party had a majority or not. When the matter reached the Uttarakhand High Court it 
quashed President’s rule. Subsequently, the Supreme Court stayed the High Court decision and ordered 
a floor test disqualifying the nine members who had defected from the Congress Party. The Uttarakhand 
Government won a vote of confidence and therefore the government was reinstated.32 In October 2016, 
the Supreme Court also restored Congress rule in Arunachal Pradesh and declared the Governor's 
decision to dismiss the government illegal. The apex court said that the Governor’s decision to advance 
the state Assembly session by a month violates the Constitution. All five judges of the Supreme Court 
bench were unanimous in setting aside the Governor's orders. The case also dealt with the issue of 
whether the Governor had the power to advance the session of the Assembly without consulting the 
cabinet. The verdict restored the political status quo in the northeastern state as of December 15, 2015. 
The verdicts regarding imposition of President’s rule in Arunachal and Uttarakhand hold special place 
because in both states the governments were reinstated. In two earlier cases, despite the court 
proclaiming that President’s Rule was wrongly issued, the dismissed governments were not reinstated. 
In the case of Bommai, the previous government was not restored because of the passage of time, 
whereas fresh elections were notified in the Rameshwar Prasad’s case. 
In relation to the amendment process of the Constitution, Supreme Court jurisprudence has 
become similarly receptive to the rights of the states. The Supreme Court in Keshavananda Bharati vs. 
State of Kerala (1973) argued that the parliament has the power to amend any part of the Constitution 
including the fundamental Rights.33 However, the judgment carried a caveat asserting that amendment 
is not an absolute power over the Constitution.  Hence, it does not include the power to alter the “basic 
structure or features” of the Constitution of which the parliamentary federal form of government was a 
                                                             
28 State of Rajasthan vs Union of India 1977, Para 150, Supreme Court Cases (SCC), 3, 1977, 603.  
29 A.K. Roy vs. Union of India, All India Reporter (A.I.R.) 1982, Supreme Court, p.710.  
30 S.R. Bommai vs Union of India, 1994, All India Reporter (A.I.R), 1994 Supreme Court, p. 1918 
31 Ram Prasad v State of Punjab, AIR 1966 SC 1607 
32 See, Sharma, Betwa: ‘Modi Governemnt to Withdraw President’s Rule, Congress back in Uttarakhand, 
11 Mat 2016, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.in/2016/05/11/modi-government-to-
withdraw-presidents-rule-congress-back-in-u/ Accessed on 2/10/16 
33 Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225 
part.  Since then, several rulings of the court, especially the Minerva Mills vs. Union of India (1980),  
S.R. Bommai vs. Union of India (1994), and I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu ( 2007) reiterated this 
constitutional position, illustrating federalism, secularism, judicial review as important constituents of 
what has come to be known as the judicial theory of the “basic structure” of the Constitution.34 This 
theory makes the constitutional courts in India the only courts in the world that review not only laws 
and executive orders but also constitutional amendments. The theory of the basic structure of the 
constitution was bolstered and consolidated in the I.R. Coelho (2007) verdict that fortified the one-vote 
majority of the Kesavananda Bharati bench by a unanimous ruling.  
In relation to jurisdictional conflict between the Union and States, some – albeit no uniform- 
evolution towards a more favorable reading of state powers can be observed. Among the earliest cases 
decided include two suits related to the state of West Bengal. In State of West Bengal vs. Union of India 
(1963), the state challenged the constitutionality of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and 
Development) Act (1957) enacted by the Parliament because the ownership of the land was vested in 
the state government. The Supreme Court ruled that the state right in the matter was subject to the Union 
right and national interest under the Constitution.35  Another important case related to the Parliament’s 
competence to levy wealth tax on agricultural land since agriculture is a state subject. In the Union of 
India V.H.S. Dhillon (1972) the Supreme Court affirmed Parliament’s power in the matter as a residuary 
subject.36  However, in a subsequent case, International Tourism Corporation Vs. State of Haryana 
(1981) the Supreme Court decided not to lean too heavily on residuary power of the Parliament under 
entry 97 of the Union List, and thought it desirable to give a “broad and plentiful interpretation” to the 
entries in the state list so as not to “whittle down the power of the state” to the detriment of the federal 
principle. A few additional cases dealing especially with industries may be sampled here.  In B. 
Vishwanathiah vs. State of Karnataka (1991) the Supreme Court ruled that the legislative power of the 
State regarding industries other than those falling under the Union List is exclusive.  However, in the 
case of mines that figure in union as well as the State List in their different aspects, if their regulation 
and development by the union is declared by the Parliament to be of  “public interest”, the field is 
abstracted from legislative competence of the state legislature (Baijnath vs. State of Bihar, Supreme 
Court, 1970; State of Tamil Nadu vs. Hind Stone, Supreme Court, 1981; and Naniyanayaka vs. State of 
Karnataka, Karnataka High Court, 1990). 37  Laying down a broad principle of constitutional 
interpretation, the Supreme Court in Ujagar Prints (II) vs. Union of India (1989) observed: “Entries in 
legislative lists, it may be recalled, are not sources of legislative power, but are merely topics or fields 
of legislation and must receive a liberal construction inspired by a broad and generous spirit and not 
in a narrow pedantic sense.  The expression with respect of article 246 brings in the doctrine of pith 
and substance in the understanding of the exertion of the legislative power and wherever the question 
of legislative competence is raised, the test is whether the legislation looked at as a whole is substantially 
with respect to the particular topic of legislation.  If the legislation has a substantial and not merely a 
remote connection with the entry, the matter may well be taken to be legislation on the topic.”38 
In a more recent case, State of West Bengal vs. Keshoram Industries Ltd. (plus a group of similar 
cases) (2004), the Supreme Court examined the constitutional allocation of legislative and taxation 
powers between the Union and the States at great length. A five-judge bench chaired by Chief Justice 
V.N. Khare delivered a 4:1 verdict. The matter related to coal, tea, brick-field, and minor minerals in 
which entries in the State List are subject to the Union’s power of regulation and development in the 
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public/national interest. Some important points of interpretation that emerged from this judgement are 
as follows: (1) “The various entries in the three lists [under Schedule VII of the constitution which 
specifies  the union, state and concurrent list of legislative powers] are not ‘powers’ of legislation, but 
‘fields’ of legislation….taxation is regarded as a distinct matter and is separately set out (emphasis in 
the source); (2) “The Union’s power to regulate and control does not result in depriving the States of 
their power to levy tax or a fee within their legislative competence without trenching upon the field of 
regulation and control.”  (3) “Every effort should be made as far as possible to reconcile the seeming 
conflict between the provisions of the state legislation and the union legislation. Unless the court forms 
an opinion that the extent of the alleged invasion by a State Legislature into the field of the Union 
Legislature is so great as would justify the view that in pith and substance the impugned tax is a tax 
within the domain of the Union Legislature, the levy of tax would not be liable to be struck down”.39  
The relatively favorable interpretation which the Supreme Court had adopted in relation to state 
rights in the cases referred to above does not apply however to Treaty making powers and state 
reorganization. In part, the hands of the Supreme Court judges are more tied in both instances. Under 
the text of the Indian constitution treaty-making power is a prerogative of the union executive. Similarly, 
article 3 of the Constitution authorizes the central parliament to redraw state boundaries unilaterally, 
without the prior consent of the affected state(s). With the rising role of the states in foreign (economic) 
policy and their increasing relevance as political communities in the pluralized party system of the 
1990s, the Supreme Court may be expected to find ways in which a stronger input of the states in both 
processes could be found. Yet, thus far, the Supreme Court held on to its ruling in Maganbhai 
Ishwarbahi vs Union of India (1970), according to which “…if a treaty, agreement or convention with 
a foreign state deals with a subject within the competence of the state legislature, the [union] Parliament 
alone has, notwithstanding Article 246(3), the power to make laws to implement the treaty, agreement 
or convention or any decision made at the international conference, association, or other body... thereby 
power is conferred upon the Parliament which it may not otherwise possess.”40 Similarly, on the issue 
of state reorganization, the Court has upheld its earlier ruling in the Babulal Parate vs State of Bombay 
(1960) case41. In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to address the validity of the Parliament which 
unilaterally amended a previously sanctioned bill by the Bombay state assembly to split the state in three 
parts: Maharashtra, Gujarat and the Union Territory of Bombay. Instead, the Union Parliament revoked 
its earlier proposal and decided to include Bombay within the State of Maharashtra. In justifying this 
decision, the Supreme Court argued that the states had no rights under the Indian constitution. The 
Supreme Court maintained the same line of argument in more recent cases. For instance, the Uttar 
Pradesh Reorganisation Act 2000, which led to the creation of Uttaranchal was challenged in Pradeep 
Chaudhary Vs Union of India case.42  According to Article 3, the President must refer the Bill to create 
a new state to the parent legislature to solicit its views. The issue pertained to the Schedule to the referred 
Bill creating the new state of Uttaranchal including Haridwar city but not the entire Haridwar district. 
After the state legislature approved the bill, it was amended by Parliament to include the entire Hardiwar 
district.43  The Petitioners sought a referral of the amended bill to the state legislature as its consent on 
the eventual state boundary adjudication was not properly sought. The Supreme Court dismissed this 
view and argued that ‘substantive compliance with the proviso was sufficient and even in a case where 
substantive amendment is carried out, the amended Parliamentary need not be referred to the State 
Legislature again for obtaining its fresh views.’44 
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In sum, these cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court has become an effective guardian of 
federalism through its jurisprudence on President’s Rule and the constitutional entrenchment of 
federalism as part of the basic structure. The same (though not uniformly) appears to hold true for those 
cases which dealt with centre-state conflicts on legislative competencies. One may assume that the 
political climate which had become more favorable to state rights since the 1990s enabled the Supreme 
to adopt more state-favorable positions in those recent rulings. In contrast, the Court has upheld a 
restrictive reading of the powers of the states in treaty-making powers, state reorganization and (of 
increasing relevance but beyond the purview of this paper) in matters of national security. The 
reemergence of a majority government headed by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party may put 
it under pressure to read some state rights more restrictively, especially where they could be interpreted 
as strengthening India as a pluralized and multiculturally diverse country and not just as a ‘federal’ state. 
This will require closer scrutiny of where the Court is headed in years to come, particularly in cases 
relating to federal asymmetry, national identity and citizenship.  
 
